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Abstract
Are eﬃciency considerations important for understanding diﬀerences in the develop-
ment of institutions? We model institutional quality as the degree to which obligations
associated with exchanging capital can be enforced. Establishing a positive level of
enforcement requires an aggregate investment of capital that is no longer available for
production. When capital endowments are more unequally distributed, the bigger dis-
persion in marginal products makes it optimal to invest more resources in enforcement.
The optimal allocation of the institutional cost across agents is not monotonic and en-
tails a redistribution of endowments before production begins. Investing in enforcement
beneﬁts primarily agents at the bottom of the endowment distribution and leads to
a reduction in consumption and income inequality. Eﬃciency, redistribution and the
quality of institutions are thus intricately linked and should be studied jointly.
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11 Introduction
Well-functioning institutions play a pivotal role in economic development and growth. As
Rajan and Zingales (2003) put it, proper institutions allow economies to “[unleash] the power
of ﬁnancial markets to create wealth and spread opportunity.” North (1990), Hurwicz (1994)
and others have pointed out that in order to achieve an eﬃcient allocation of resources,
an economy requires institutions that can enforce obligations from trade as well as property
rights. Somewhat surprisingly then, ineﬀective institutions appear to be remarkably persistent
in many countries. What causes some countries to develop well-functioning institutions,
while others, even at similar stages of economic development, don’t? More generally, what
determines how institutions develop?
A large literature – see, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (1994), Acemoglu and Johnson
(2005), or Acemoglu and Robinson (2008), among many others – argues that institutional
choices are largely driven by strategic or political considerations. While these factors are
clearly relevant, it is puzzling that the notion of eﬃciency has not been equally emphasized
as a potential explanation for how institutions develop. In this paper, we provide a tractable
way to model institutional choice and explore whether eﬃciency considerations can generate
diﬀerences in the quality of institutions across economies.1
The basic idea we develop in this paper is that building institutions is akin to the adop-
tion of a new, better technology. Like new technologies, institutions are costly to set up
and require the investment of resources that cannot be used for other productive purposes.
Although investing in institutions is not directly productive, it makes a better allocation of
resources possible – here, through enforcing the obligations from trade. In this sense, we ar-
gue that eﬃciency gains are a key determinant of institutional investments. In fact, precisely
how these investments make trade possible matters little for our results. We focus in this pa-
per on limited enforceability as the friction which institutional improvements help mitigate.
Modeling other aspects of institutions that increase the size of of the set of contracts which
agents can write with one another would produce similar insights.
We study an economy where all agents operate the same production technology charac-
terized by decreasing returns to scale. Agents are alike except in that some have a higher
endowment of capital than others. Since returns to scale are decreasing, there are potential
1This is not to say that the literature has not recognized eﬃciency or, more generally speaking, economic
considerations as important (see, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005)). Our paper, however,
places the emphasis solely on eﬃciency.
2gains associated with redistributing capital across agents. However, agents will agree to a re-
allocation only if they can be compensated. This, in turn, requires that transfers across agents
be enforceable after production has taken place. We assume that establishing a positive level
of enforcement requires an investment of capital. Then, a trade-oﬀ arises since capital can be
used either as an input in production or to increase enforcement.2 The beneﬁts of enforcement
depend on the potential gains from trade and hence on the initial discrepancy in marginal
products across agents. As endowment inequality increases, beneﬁts from enforcement rise.
Who should pay for setting up the institutions? Until enforcement is introduced, its ﬁ-
nancing cannot be imposed on agents and contributions have to be made on a voluntary basis.
In other words, eﬃcient institutions cannot be set up independently from the way they are
ﬁnanced. We provide a detailed characterization of the distribution of the institutional cost
by showing how a market mechanism can achieve the eﬃcient social arrangement. In this
environment, the eﬃcient investment in enforcement is ﬁnanced by fees that grant agents
access to the market.3 We show that agents’ contributions to the institutional cost eventually
rise with endowments, but that they are not monotonic – let alone linear – in endowments.
Eﬃciency considerations alone thus suggest that investing in enforcement should be accom-
panied by a redistribution of endowments. The optimal redistribution, however, does not
take the form of a simple mean-preserving contraction as it would in an environment where
market imperfections are exogenous and costless. We show, in addition, that the income and
consumption gains from an eﬃcient level of enforcement accrue primarily to agents at the
bottom of the endowment distribution. Thus, investing optimally in enforcement compresses
the distribution of income and consumption.
This points to an intricate, dynamic relationship between inequality, redistribution and
institutional quality. Agents with low capital endowments reap the beneﬁts of better insti-
tutions, which enables them to accumulate more resources over time. Therefore, assuming
simple intergenerational linkages, investment in enforcement reduces endowment and income
inequality over time. As the dispersion in endowment diminishes, so do diﬀerences in marginal
2Our set-up follows Koeppl (2007), who studies a similar trade-oﬀ in the context of intertemporal risk
sharing.
3Modeling enforcement as a technology can thus be interpreted in two complementary ways. Enforcement
allows one to set up a market environment for decentralized exchange of capital. This includes the institutions
necessary to enforce property rights and the obligations that arise from trade. Alternatively, the technology
can be seen as a redistributive tax system directly, where capital is reallocated before production through
taxation and where transfers redistribute income after production. In both interpretations, investment costs
are incurred ex-ante to set up the necessary institutions.
3products across agents, while the optimal investment in enforcement also declines. Diﬀerences
in marginal products, however, never fall below a threshold that would make investment in
enforcement unnecessary.
Our results have important implications for the growing literature on the eﬀects of inequal-
ity on economic growth. This literature has established a theoretical link between endowment
inequality, the absence of good institutions – often modeled via an exogenous degree of mar-
ket incompleteness – and economic development, suggesting that redistributing productive
resources can foster growth.4 We show that once one treats market incompleteness as en-
dogenous, the optimal policy should comprise investments in institutions that improve the
functioning of markets. In fact, while eﬃciency calls for some redistribution of endowments,
the institutional investment makes redistribution possible in the ﬁrst place by compensating
agents through beneﬁts from trade.5
Recognizing that the degree of market incompleteness is endogenous greatly complicates
the interpretation of standard empirical tests of the hypothesis that inequality matters for
economic growth. For instance, Perotti (1994) argues that conditional on “the degree of mar-
ket imperfection,” inequality has a negative eﬀect on aggregate investment in cross-country
data. Likewise, after controlling parametrically for the initial level of inequality, proxies for
the degree of market imperfection have a negative eﬀect on investment. Even assuming that
both wealth inequality and market imperfections are captured in a satisfactory fashion in
these empirical exercises, the fact that the two variables have causal eﬀects on each other
makes quantifying their respective importance impossible outside of a structural model.6
Furthermore, our model makes it clear that wealth inequality is not the variable on which
on those tests should be founded. We establish a link between the dispersion of marginal
products, economic development and institutional choice. A high degree of wealth inequal-
ity may or may not imply a large ex-ante dispersion in marginal products. We illustrate
this critical point by formalizing a hypothesis recently formulated by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ
(2000). They surmise that initial inequality could explain why some nations in the western
hemisphere were much faster to develop institutions conducive to trade than others. Enger-
4See Benabou (1996), Aghion (1998) or Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa (1999) for a review of this
argument.
5Market allocations are often contrasted with redistribution through governments. See most recently
Acemoglu, Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007) and the discussion in Albanesi (2007). We point out that investment
in market-supporting institutions and redistribution should optimally complement each other.
6This goes beyond the well-known issues associated with the scarcity and poor quality of wealth inequality
data. Given these issues, Perotti (1994) uses income inequality as a proxy for wealth inequality.
4man and Sokoloﬀ (2002) describe 19th century Latin America as an area where both human
and physical capital were highly concentrated. The United States and Canada, however, had
less inequality in both forms of capital and developed better market-supporting institutions.
We argue that if human and physical capital are complementary in production, a suﬃciently
high positive correlation between human and physical capital endowment leads to small dif-
ferences in marginal products across agents, which reduces incentives to invest in institutions
conducive to trade.7
Our basic point is that in order to understand the relationship between institutions, in-
equality and economic performance, one must consider where the gains from building institu-
tions arise, and how these gains can be redistributed throughout the economy. Fundamentally,
if inadequate institutions persist, this must be because one cannot allocate the beneﬁts of bet-
ter institutions in such a way as to compensate those who pay for them.
2 The Model
We will ﬁrst study the determinants of institutional quality in a static environment populated
by a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each agent is endowed with a quantity ai ≥ 0
of capital, where we assume that ai increases with i on [0,1]. This distribution of endowments
is non-degenerate so that there is some measurable inequality among agents and is suﬃciently
smooth to allow us to use standard variational arguments.
Agents are also endowed with a technology that transforms an input k ≥ 0 of capital into
a quantity kα of a consumption good where α ∈ (0,1). We adopt this speciﬁcation of the
production function simply for concreteness. Assuming some form of decreasing returns to
scale suﬃces to derive our results. All agents seek to maximize their end-of-period income
and hence consumption of the single good.
Since the individual production technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale and endow-
ments diﬀer across agents, marginal products also diﬀer across agents. Therefore, agents have
an incentive to trade capital before production starts: agents with low capital endowments
would like to borrow some capital for production from other agents in exchange for transfers
of the consumption good once production has taken place. We assume, however, that enforce-
ment is limited. Agents can default on any transfer they owe after production, in which case
7Doepke and Eisfeldt (2007) oﬀer a diﬀerent explanation for the Engerman-Sokoloﬀ hypothesis that com-
bines economic and strategic considerations.
5they incur a ﬁxed cost η > 0 denominated in units of consumption. This formulation of the
default option follows Sappington (1983) and Banerjee and Newman (1993), among others.
We interpret η as an absconding cost. By paying this ﬁxed cost, agents erase any payment
obligation they face.8
Our main goal is to endogenize the level of enforcement. In this context, a natural trade-oﬀ
arises between devoting resources to improve enforcement and to produce the consumption
good. Studying this trade-oﬀ will enable us to characterize the determinants of institutional
quality. We assume therefore that establishing an economy-wide enforcement level η ≥ 0
requires an aggregate capital cost g(η) ≥ 0 that must be borne before production begins.
We also assume that the cost function g is strictly convex, strictly increasing and twice
diﬀerentiable on (0,+∞), and that g(0) = 0. To allow for ﬁxed costs associated with a
positive level of enforcement, we only require that limη&0 g(η) ≥ 0.
3 Institutional Choice and the Allocation of Capital
3.1 Capital Allocation with an Exogenous Level of Enforcement
As a benchmark for the subsequent analysis, we consider ﬁrst the situation where the level of
enforcement η is given exogenously and does not require any investment of capital. In that
context, all capital can be used in production of the consumption good and the exogenous
level of enforcement determines what trades between agents can be supported.
Assume then that agents can trade capital before production takes place in a competitive
market, taking as given the gross interest rate R > 0 for renting capital.9 Given the exogenous
level of punishment, agents maximizes their income, taking into account the cost of renting





i + (ai − ki)R (3.1)
8Our results, however, can easily be generalized to a broader class of default cost speciﬁcations. One
could assume, for instance, that default costs rise with the quantity of capital a given agent chooses to use in
production (or, equivalently, with output) according to a schedule D(η,k) for all η,k ≥ 0. The tools we use
in this paper would simply require that D be jointly concave.
9The model then becomes a simpliﬁed version of the canonical set-up studied by much of the literature on
inequality and growth. See for example Aghion (1998) and Benabou (1996).
6subject to
(ki − ai)R ≤ η. (3.2)
The constraint reﬂects the fact that the agent cannot commit to a payment when his produc-
tion exceeds the cost of defaulting. In particular, the agent’s ability to borrow depends on
the interest rate R. In equilibrium, R must be such that the market for capital clears. The
following result summarizes how equilibria depend on the exogenous level of enforcement.
Proposition 3.1. Given η, a unique competitive equilibrium exists. Furthermore, aggregate
output and the equilibrium interest rate R rise with enforcement level η.
Proof. The aggregate supply of capital,
R
aidi, is independent of both η and of R. Given η,
increases in R lower capital use because this makes capital more costly and makes borrow-
ing constraints tighter. Therefore, the demand schedule is monotonically decreasing in R,
implying that equilibria are unique.
For the second part of the proposition, ﬁx η and let R(η) be the corresponding equilibrium












(ki − ai)R(η) ≤ η for almost all i.
Indeed, any solution {ki ≥ 0|i ∈ [0,1]} to this constrained maximization problem must satisfy,
for almost all i,
αk
α−1
i − θ − ρiR(η) = 0
ρi (η − (ki − ai)R(η)) = 0,
for some non-negative Lagrange multipliers {θ,ρi|i ∈ [0,1]}. The competitive allocation




From this maximization problem it is clear that the desired result follows, provided
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Figure 1: Capital allocation (η exogenous; no cost)
falls for all agents. But that contradicts the fact that both R(η) and R(η0) are equilibrium
rates, since aggregate capital supply is the same in both cases.
Figure 3.1 illustrates this result. For the given level of enforcement level η, the implied
equilibrium interest rate R(η) determines a unique optimal scale k(η) of production. Agents
with endowment past threshold a(η) ≡ k(η) −
η
R(η) are unconstrained. All other agents are
constrained and operate at a lower scale with capital input given by the borrowing constraint,
or ki = ai+
η
R(η). In equilibrium, capital input rises one-for-one with initial endowments until
agents become unconstrained.
It is clear that when η is suﬃciently high, no agent is constrained and markets are eﬀec-
tively complete. On the other hand, when η = 0, trade is impossible and autarky results.
More generally, a higher enforcement level leads to higher interest rates and higher aggregate
output. When enforcement increases from η to η0, borrowing constraints are relaxed and the
demand for capital shifts up at all rental rates. Since the total supply of capital is ﬁxed, it
must be the case that the equilibrium interest rate R increases. A higher equilibrium interest
rate causes the optimal scale of production for unconstrained agents to fall. Because the total
supply of capital is ﬁxed, the two schedules must cross and it must therefore be the case that
8η0/R(η0) > η/R(η). As a result, the dispersion in marginal products declines, and, corre-
spondingly, output increases. Hence, improvements in enforcement raise output by allowing
marginal products of capital to become more homogeneous through trade, much like a direct
redistribution of endowments would.
3.2 The Optimal Level of Enforcement
The foregoing analysis suggests that a collection of agents whose endowments are unevenly
distributed have an incentive to implement an enforcement technology. Better enforcement
leads to a reduction in the dispersion of marginal products through trade. However, such an
improvement in institutional quality presumably requires resources that are no longer available
for production. This is now captured by the aggregate cost g(η) of capital that is necessary to
achieve a level η of enforcement. To study the resulting trade-oﬀ between using endowments
for institutional building and using them in production, we will ﬁrst consider a planner whose
objective is to maximize aggregate consumption. This focuses the analysis on pure eﬃciency
considerations since such a planner has no direct interest in reducing inequality.10 We will
argue later that the optimal allocation that emanates from this social planner problem can
be supported as an equilibrium in decentralized markets.
Given a distribution of endowments, the planner chooses a capital allocation k = {ki ≥
0|i ∈ [0,1]}, a schedule of post-production transfers t = {ti ∈ R|i ∈ [0,1]} and a level of
enforcement, η ≥ 0. The planner’s choice is restricted in two ways. First, agents can choose
to stay in autarky rather than participate in the proposed allocation. Second, agents can
decide to default on the transfers stipulated by the planner, in which case they incur the






i − ti)di (3.3)
10In addition, we show in an appendix available upon request that this entails no loss of generality. Assuming
instead that the planner maximizes a strictly concave welfare function over agents’ end-of-period consumption
does not change the nature of the optimal allocation. The inclusion of ex-ante participation and ex-post
enforcement constraints implies that there is no room for redistributing income at the end of the period, once
eﬃciency considerations have been taken into account.
9subject to
Z





i − ti ≥ a
α
i for almost all i (3.5)
ti ≤ η for almost all i (3.6) Z
tidi ≥ 0. (3.7)
The ﬁrst constraint is a resource feasibility constraint. The second set of constraints states
that agents have to be willing to participate in the proposed allocation given that they can
always opt for autarky. The third set of conditions expresses the fact that the enforcement of
transfers is limited. The ﬁnal constraint states that the planner cannot distribute additional
resources at the end of the period: aggregate consumption cannot exceed aggregate output.
Naturally, this constraint will bind at the optimal allocation, so that maximizing aggregate
consumption is equivalent to maximizing aggregate output.
A generically unique solution to this problem exists, as we demonstrate in the appendix.
We will now argue that because raising the enforcement level is costly, the planner never
chooses to eliminate all inequality in marginal products.
Proposition 3.2. The optimal allocation with endogenous enforcement is such that ki is not
almost everywhere equal.
Proof. Denote the non-negative multipliers associated with the constraints (3.4) - (3.7) by
θ, {λi|i ∈ [0,1]}, {µi|i ∈ [0,1]} and τ, respectively. If the planner chooses not to invest in
enforcement (η = 0), then ki = ai almost everywhere and the result holds trivially. Assume





µidi = 0 (3.8)
αk
α−1
i (1 + λi) − θ = 0 for almost all i (3.9)
−1 − λi − µi + τ = 0 for almost all i. (3.10)
Also note that, together with the usual slackness conditions, these conditions are suﬃcient.
11See Cesari (1983). Our set of constraints satisﬁes a standard constraint qualiﬁcation.
10Assume now, by way of contradiction, that ki is constant a.e. Then, λi is constant a.e. as
well by condition (3.9) as is then µi by condition (3.10). But since η > 0, resource feasibility
requires that ai > ki for a non-negligible set of i. This implies that ti < η and µi = 0 for
that set. Hence, we need µi = 0 for almost all i, which cannot be the case by condition (3.8),
because η > 0 and θ > 0 by condition (3.9).
The intuition for this result is straightforward. When capital use is equated across agents,
marginal products are equated as well. It follows that small deviations from such an allocation
have a negligible impact on output. On the other hand, reducing the need for enforcement
(for instance by directing more capital towards constrained agents) has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on
the resources available for production. With this result in hand, we can now characterize the
optimal allocation of capital more precisely.
Proposition 3.3. The optimal allocation of capital is characterized by two endowment thresh-
olds 0 ≤ a ≤ ¯ a and two bounds on capital use 0 ≤ k ≤ ¯ k that determine the optimal capital









α if ai ∈ [a,¯ a]
¯ k if ai ≥ ¯ a,
where η is the optimal level of enforcement.
Proof. Since η = 0 implies autarky, in which case our characterization holds trivially, we
assume that the optimal solution has η > 0. Conditions (3.8)-(3.10) together with the associ-
ated slackness conditions describe the optimal solution. We ﬁrst establish that for almost all
agents, either the participation or the enforcement constraint holds with equality. Assume to
the contrary that for some non-negligible set of agents this is not the case. Then, by condition
(3.10), this is true for all agents. But this contradicts condition (3.8) whenever η > 0, since
θ > 0 by (3.9).
Consider next the set of agents with non-binding enforcement constraints (µi = 0). For





1−α. On the other hand, agents





1−α < ¯ k, where the
inequality follows from the fact that τ > 1 by (3.10), since µi + λi > 0 for almost all agents.











α ∈ [k,¯ k].
There only remains to be shown that these three groups of agents are separated by cer-
tain endowment thresholds. If agent i ∈ [0,1] is in the group with non-binding enforcement
constraints, ¯ kα − aα
i < η. Similarly, being in the group with non-binding participation con-
straints implies k
α − aα
i > η. Finally, a necessary condition for being in the group where
both constraints bind is given by kα
i −aα
i = η for some ki ∈ [k,¯ k]. These three conditions are
mutually exclusive and deﬁne the thresholds we need.
Figure 3.2 shows the shape of the optimal capital allocation. Agents with low endow-
ments have a binding enforcement constraint, but strictly prefer to participate in the optimal
arrangement. They all employ the same level k of capital. Conversely, agents with high en-
dowments have a binding participation constraint but a loose enforcement constraint. These
agents operate at the highest level of capital ¯ k. Agents in the middle have both constraints
binding and operate with the capital stock such that their income level kα
i −η exactly matches
their autarky income.
The optimal allocation can then be described by three equations that pin down the optimal
level of enforcement η and the optimal allocation of capital by determining the two cut-oﬀ
























i − ¯ a
α)di. (3.13)
The ﬁrst condition equates the marginal costs and the marginal beneﬁts of enforcement ex-
pressed in units of capital input. More enforcement enables a better allocation of capital
across agents. Hence, one can achieve the same output with a lower aggregate input of capi-
tal. Interestingly, marginal beneﬁts can then be expressed as the wedge between the inverse
of the marginal product of capital of unconstrained and constrained agents.12 The other two
12This is reminiscent of an inverse Euler equation describing eﬃciency in the literature on Mirrleesian






Figure 2: Optimal capital allocation (η endogenous; convex cost)
equations describe the feasibility of allocating capital and of transfers in terms of the two
endowment cut-oﬀs.
The optimal allocation leads to a more equal income and consumption distribution than
under autarky. In particular, all agents above the lower endowment threshold a receive their
autarkic income, while all other agents receive a ﬁxed income higher than autarky. Hence,
improving institutions by investing in costly enforcement beneﬁts agents at the lower end of
the endowment distribution.
Proposition 3.4. The optimal income distribution is a left-censored version of the income
distribution under autarky. Speciﬁcally,
k
α
i − ti =
(
aα if ai ≤ a
aα
i if ai ≥ a.
Proof. Agent i’s end-of-period income is kα
i −ti for all i ∈ [0,1]. All agents whose endowments
exceed a have a binding participation constraint. Hence, they have the same income as under
autarky. Agents with endowments under a all realize income k
α − η = aα.
It is instructive to compare the optimal allocation when enforcement is endogenous to the
13allocation that prevails when enforcement is costless and exogenous. In both cases, positive
enforcement reduces the dispersion of marginal products vis-a-vis autarky by making capital
use constant past a certain endowment threshold. There are, however, two crucial diﬀerences
when the optimal allocation involves a costly enforcement choice. First, the planner also
equates capital use among agents with low endowments. Second, transfers after production
are optimally set such that only poor agents gain from enforcement, with all other agents
receiving the same income as in autarky. This suggests that the planner combines invest-
ment in enforcement with some redistribution of endowments when covering the costs of this
investment.
3.3 Implementing the Optimal Allocation
To make these ideas precise, we will now explain how the optimal allocation can be imple-
mented with decentralized capital markets. In order to implement the optimal allocation, it
is necessary to ﬁnance the introduction of enforcement at the desired level η. Denote agent
i’s contribution of capital to the aggregate enforcement cost by κi. The planner invests these




. Then agents enter cap-
ital markets with a new endowment of capital equal to ˆ ai = ai − κi and trade capital at a
competitively determined rate R subject to a borrowing constraint given by
(ki − ˆ ai)R ≤ η. (3.14)
The following result shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented via decentralized
markets provided the cost of enforcement is distributed in a speciﬁc fashion.
Proposition 3.5. Let (η,k,t) be the solution to the social planner’s problem. Deﬁne R =
α¯ kα−1 and let κi = ai − (ki −
ti
R) for all i. Given the contribution schedule {κi|i ∈ [0,1]},
competitive markets implement the optimal solution with the equilibrium interest rate given
by R.
Proof. Let ˆ ai = ai − κi for all i so that the total supply of capital available for production is
R













tidi = 0 at the planner’s solution. Note that this also implies that the contribution
schedule κi covers the enforcement cost g(η).
We only have to verify that agent i chooses the optimal capital input, ki, at interest
rate R. If agents are unconstrained, they will choose a capital level such that the marginal
product is equal to R. Constrained agents, however, will choose a capital level that satisﬁes
the constraint (3.14).
Consider an agent with ai > ¯ a who therefore has ki = ¯ k and ti < η in the optimal
allocation. In that case, (¯ k − ˆ ai)R = ti < η so that, given R, the agent chooses to operate at
ki = ¯ k.
Agents with ai ≤ ¯ k are constrained in the optimal allocation so that ti = η. By the
deﬁnition of κi, this implies that ˆ ai = ki −
η
R. Hence, the agent chooses ki < ¯ k given his
borrowing constraint (3.14). This completes the proof.
One could interpret κi as a tax schedule to ﬁnance the establishment of a capital market.
On the agent’s side they serve as an entry fee for participating in the market for capital.
Note that some agents might receive a subsidy (κi < 0) prior to entering the market. Most
interestingly, the structure of this tax or fee schedule is not monotonic in initial endowments,
as we argue next.13
Corollary 3.6. Assume that η > 0. The contribution schedule {κi|i ∈ [0,1]} rises monotoni-
cally with endowments on [0,a], decreases on [a,¯ k], and rises once again past ¯ k. Furthermore,
the schedule’s local maximum at a is strictly positive, while its local minimum at ¯ k is zero. In
particular, κi > 0 whenever ki < ai.
Proof. For an agent i such that ai < a, we have κi = ai −(k−
η
R), implying that κi rises with
i since ai does. If an agent has endowment ai ∈ [a,¯ a], we have
κi = (ai − ki) +
η
R








Diﬀerentiating this expression with respect to ai shows that the schedule decreases with
endowments in this region. Finally, if agent i has endowment ai > ¯ a, then κi = ai − (¯ k −
ti
R).
Since the participation constraint binds for such agents, it is the case that ti = ¯ kα−aα
i . Some
algebra then shows that
κiR = ¯ k
α − ¯ kR − (a
α
i − aiR).
13We would like to thank Christian Zimmerman for pointing this out to us.
15¯ a k(¯ a) a
Fee (κ)
Endowment
Figure 3: Optimal Fee Schedule (κi)
Since ¯ k is the value of k that maximizes kα − kR, it follows that κi falls with ai until ai = ¯ k
– where it is zero – and then rises again. Since κi = 0 when ai = ¯ k and the compensation
schedule decreases on [a,¯ k], it follows immediately that the schedule’s local maximum at a is
strictly positive.
This shows that the planner achieves a better allocation of capital by using investment in
institutions and redistribution in a complementary way. Some agents bear a disproportionate
fraction of the institutional cost, a set that includes agents at the top of the distribution
(see Figure 3.3). Agents who lend capital on the market have to pay a positive fee but the
ensuing trade compensates them exactly for this investment. Agents with low endowments
might receive a subsidy, a possibility depicted by a dashed line in Figure 3.3. Whether this
occurs depends on the speciﬁc parameterization of the model.
4 Inequality and Institutions
4.1 More Inequality in Marginal Products Leads to Better Insti-
tutions
Whenever endowments are more unequally distributed, the ex-ante dispersion in marginal
products increases. Hence, one would expect that economies with more endowment inequality
16should invest more resources in institutions that provide better enforcement. To formalize this,
we model the notion of rising inequality as follows. Let E(a) denote the average endowment.
We say that the endowment schedule ˆ a = a+δ(a−E(a)) is more unequal than the distribution
a when δ > 0. Throughout this section, we assume that for δ small enough, endowments
remain almost surely non-negative. Alternatively, we could produce symmetric results for
mean-preserving contractions rather than spreads.
We ﬁrst look at the case where there are only two agents with diﬀerent endowments. In
that simple case, the impact of greater inequality on returns to enforcement is transparent.
The nature of the optimal allocation is easy to describe, since the two cut-oﬀ points determine
the allocation. When the spread in endowments increases, at the old enforcement level the
spread in capital inputs must also increase. But then the marginal beneﬁt of enforcement
exceeds the marginal costs. Hence, it is optimal to invest more in enforcement.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that there are two agents. When the distribution of endowments
becomes more unequal, the optimal level of enforcement η increases.
Proof. Write initial endowments in this case as (a − δ,a + δ) where a > 0 and δ ∈ [0,a).
Denote the production function as f and its inverse as h. Since f is strictly concave, h is
strictly convex. We also denote capital use by k1 for the agent with low endowment, while k2
denotes capital use by the agent with high endowment.
Suppose the enforcement level is given by η > 0. Then the capital allocation must solve
k2 = h(f(a + δ) − η)
where k2 ≤ 2a. Indeed, the enforcement constraint has to be binding for the poor agent at
the optimal choice, since otherwise enforcement costs could be reduced. This means that the
rich agent receives a transfer of exactly η at the optimal arrangement.
The agent with the low endowment then operates with capital k1 = 2a−h(f(a+δ)−η)−
g(η). Hence, total output is given by
Φ(η,δ) ≡ f(a + δ) − η + f (2a − h(f(a + δ) − η) − g(η)).
Note that the function Φ is strictly concave in η. The envelope theorem then implies that







Diﬀerentiating the function Φ with respect to η we obtain
Φ1(η(δ),δ) = −1 + f
0(k1)(h
0(f(a + δ) − η) − g
0(η))
where k1 = 2a − h(f(a + δ) − η) − g(η) is the capital allocated to the low-endowment agent.









since h is convex and f is strictly increasing and concave. Furthermore, both h(f(a+δ)−η)
and h0(f(a+δ)−η) are increasing in δ, as f(a+δ) rises with δ. This implies that k1 decreases
in δ. The concavity of f then implies that f0(k1) rises with δ too. Thus we obtain that
Φ12(η(δ),δ) > 0
which completes the proof.
Returning to the case with a continuum of agents, suppose that the planner chooses to bear
the ﬁxed cost limη&0 g(η) and to invest in strictly positive enforcement for a given distribution
of endowments. We now show that this remains the case if the distribution of endowments
becomes more unequal.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the planner opts for strictly positive enforcement for a given
endowment distribution. This remains true when the endowment distribution becomes more
unequal.
Proof. Let k be the optimal capital allocation in the ﬁrst economy while η > 0 is the chosen







Consider now the more unequal distribution of endowments described by ˆ ai = ai +δ(ai −
a∗). We will show that, holding η ﬁxed, a feasible capital allocation ˆ k exists in the more





i di. Hence, strictly positive enforcement remains
optimal for a more unequal distribution of endowments.










where it is assumed that δ is small enough that ˆ ki ≥ 0 for all i. This is without loss of
generality as the argument we use below is local. Leaving transfers unchanged, participation






















We need to show that the new allocation satisﬁes the resource constraint. First, note that
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Hence, evaluating this expression at δ = 0 shows that small changes to δ do not increase the




























which completes the proof.
Intuition suggests that monotonicity holds in this environment in a more general sense.
Increases in the dispersion of marginal products should lead the planner to increase η. Looking
at equations (3.11) through (3.13), notice that for any given enforcement level η, the last two
equations alone pin down the cut-oﬀ levels for the optimal capital allocation. Hence, one
19can ﬁnd this allocation for any value of η independently of the enforcement choice. In other
words, one can solve for the optimal level of enforcement by ﬁrst determining the optimal
capital allocation as a function of η and, then, compare the marginal cost and beneﬁts to ﬁnd
the eﬃcient level of enforcement. Hence, it is optimal to raise the enforcement level for any
marginal change in the distribution of endowments that causes more agents to be constrained
or the wedge between the two cut-oﬀ points to increase.
4.2 The Engerman-Sokoloﬀ Hypothesis
Our framework predicts that economies with more endowment inequality should be quicker
to invest in institutions that support trade. This prediction may seem puzzling in light of the
historical evidence for the Western Hemisphere surveyed by Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (2002).
Their evidence suggests that human and physical capital were more highly concentrated in
Latin America than in the United States and Canada, and that the latter countries chose
to invest in institutions conducive to trade much earlier. In this section we argue that the
eﬃciency considerations we emphasize in this paper, far from casting doubt on this hypothesis,
provide additional support for it.
To see this, augment our static model to include heterogeneity in both physical and human
capital. Agents are now endowed with a quantity ai > 0 of physical capital and a level hi > 0
of human capital for all i ∈ [0,1] with the joint distribution of human and physical capital
described by G. Agents are also endowed with a technology that transfers physical capital
into consumption goods according to a Cobb-Douglas production function h1−αkα, where h is
the human capital of the agent and α ∈ (0,1). Since human capital cannot be traded across
agents, the endowment of human capital acts like an agent-speciﬁc productivity parameter
that is ﬁxed.
To show that eﬃciency considerations can rationalize the Engerman and Sokoloﬀ hypoth-
esis, we simply consider the case where the choice is between autarky and full enforcement.
If there is no investment in enforcement, default cannot be punished. Hence all transfers are










α) + COV (h
1−α,a
α). (4.1)
Alternatively, the planner can achieve full enforcement at an aggregate ﬁxed cost of C > 0
units of capital. Markets are then complete and the planner is able to equate marginal
20products across agents. Denoting the total endowment of human and physical capital by ¯ h







Since with full enforcement all transfers can be enforced, participation constraints for all
agents can be met if and only if aggregate output increases after the enforcement cost C has
been incurred.14 Using aggregate resource feasibility, it follows directly that full enforcement

















The planner will choose to invest in enforcement whenever yE > yA.
Holding the endowment distribution of the other factor ﬁxed, a mean preserving spread
in either human capital or physical capital endowments lowers output under autarky without
aﬀecting the outcome under complete markets. Hence, as in the analysis with only one input,
more inequality can lead to more investment in institutions, as the beneﬁts from trade have
increased. However, in this two-dimensional setting, for any given marginal distribution of
physical and human capital, the correlation in the endowments of both factors of production
also determines institutional investment. If endowments in human and physical capital are
suﬃciently positively correlated, aggregate output is higher under autarky, and there is no
institutional investment.
Proposition 4.3. Introducing complete markets with full enforcement at a ﬁxed cost C leads





α) > COV (h
1−α,a
α). (4.4)
In economies where both human and physical capital are highly concentrated, the gains
from introducing institutions are small, since the marginal products of capital are not very
14An optimal allocation with enforcement can once again be implemented via decentralized markets with
a speciﬁc schedule of entry fees and subsidies, where the fee schedule has to satisfy all agents’ participation
constraints.








so that inequality (4.4) can never be met.
This result underscores the fact that it is inequality in marginal products before trade
that matters for returns to institutional investments, not endowment inequality per se. In
the case of the Western Hemisphere, the fact that both human and physical capital have been
highly concentrated historically in much of Latin America could explain why institutional
quality has lagged behind its counterpart in the United States or Canada. In economies
where physical and human capital endowments are highly correlated, institutions conducive
to trading physical resources may not have much eﬀect on output and growth, unless poor
individuals are able to acquire more human capital.
5 The Dynamics of Enforcement and Inequality
How do institutions and inequality evolve over time given initial conditions? This section
provides some answers by introducing simple intergenerational linkages in our model. Time
is discrete and denoted by t ∈ {0,1,...}. In every period t ≥ 0, a single member of each
family i ∈ [0,1] is alive and inherits as endowment a given fraction γi ∈ [0,1] of their parent’s
income, where γi is strictly increasing in i. This endowment can be used in production exactly
as in the static model or as investment in the enforcement technology. We also assume that
investments in enforcement fully depreciate across periods, although this could be relaxed
with little eﬀect on our results. For simplicity, we will assume that the current enforcement
choice is myopic in the sense that each generation makes its institutional choice without taking
into account the eﬀects of the current choice on future generations’ welfare.15
If there is no enforcement technology, the only feasible allocation of capital is autarky
15Exogenously given intergenerational linkages are standard in most of the existing literature on inequality,
growth and missing markets. See, for example, Aghion and Bolton (1997), Banerjee and Newman (1993)
or Benabou (1996). There are at least two interpretations for such transfers: “warm-glow” altruism in the
sense of Andreoni (1989) and intergenerational spillovers. The second interpretation is best understood if one
thinks of productive resources in part as human capital. It has the advantage of side-stepping an obvious
weakness of the warm-glow interpretation, namely, the fact that lineages fail to internalize the consequences
of their transfers on the welfare of their oﬀspring. That concern is particularly strong in environments with
redistribution policies. We thus emphasize the spillover interpretation and assume that generations are not
linked in any other way.
22in all periods. It follows directly that for this case the endowment of members of lineage
i converges geometrically to γ
1
1−α
i over time. Hence, the endowment distribution converges
to the corresponding invariant distribution.16 We assume that in period 0, the distribution
of endowments is this invariant distribution, which amounts to assuming that lineages have
lived in autarky for long enough prior to that time to be near their invariant autarkic state.
With the possibility to invest in enforcement, we assume that this invariant distribution
is suﬃciently unequal so that it is optimal to bear the ﬁxed cost in period 0. Otherwise,
no investment in enforcement is ever made, and the economy remains forever at the initial
invariant distribution. Under this assumption, bearing the ﬁxed cost remains optimal in all
subsequent periods, and introducing enforcement leads to a progressive reduction of endow-
ment inequality. This in turn reduces the beneﬁts of investing in enforcement and successively
reduces such investment.
Proposition 5.1. If it is optimal to invest in enforcement at date t = 0, then the optimal
allocation features a positive enforcement level for all periods t ≥ 0 that decreases over time.
Furthermore, the economy converges monotonically to a long-run invariant distribution of
income and endowments with progressively less inequality and higher output.
Proof. Let at be the endowment function and ηt the optimal enforcement level in period t.
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that enforcement decreases in period 1, 0 < η1 < η0.
Then, we establish that endowments increase over time, i.e., that a2
i ≥ a1
i for all i. The
desired result will then follow by induction.




i , the optimal allocation at t = 0 is
described by equations (3.11)-(3.13). There are two cut-oﬀ points a0 = γ
1
1−α




determining capital and transfers given the optimal level η0. The new endowment function is














i if γi ≥ γ
0.







i whenever γi < γ
0, we have that E(a1) > E(a0).
16Note that the endowment distribution converges at a geometric rate to a single mass point if lineages be-
queath the same fraction of their income regardless of whether institutional investments are made. Eventually,
then, output is at its maximum independently of the economy’s history of institutional choices.
23Suppose ﬁrst that we constrain the planner to continue opting for enforcement level η0 in
period 1. It is straightforward to verify that the optimal allocation of capital is still described
by equations (3.12) and (3.13). In particular, the new upper endowment threshold ¯ a1(η0) is
the same as in period 0, since the enforcement level has not changed. The lower threshold
a1(η0) has to increase from its period 0 value, since the aggregate endowment E(a1) has gone
up. Otherwise, some capital would not be used in production, a situation that cannot be
optimal. These new thresholds pin down the new optimal allocation conditional on keeping
the enforcement level at η0.
We will ﬁrst argue that this candidate allocation yields an average income level that
exceeds its autarky counterpart at endowment distribution a1, so that, η1 > 0. First note
that the optimal allocation of capital {k0
i : i ∈ [0,1]} in period 0 is still feasible in period 1


























as γi < γ
0. This implies directly that in period 1 income is higher for everyone with the
optimal allocation of period 0. As transfers sum to zero, aggregate output is also higher with
enforcement than with autarky. Hence, it remains optimal to invest enforcement in period 1.















as the corresponding cut-oﬀ point for capital ki(η0) has increased. From the concavity of the
objective function and the strict convexity of the constraint set – which is ensured by our
assumptions on g conditional on incurring the ﬁxed cost – we have a unique optimal value of
enforcement η1 that satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition (3.11). Furthermore, for η → 0 marginal
beneﬁts exceed marginal costs and for η → ∞ the opposite is true. Hence, optimal level of
enforcement in period 1 must decrease, i.e., η1 < η0.
Finally, we will show that endowments increase over time for almost all i. Note that the
endowment distribution has not changed above the cut-oﬀ point a0. As η1 < η0, by equation
(3.13) it must then be the case that ¯ a1(η1) increases relative to its period 0 value. Suppose now
that the lower cut-oﬀ point decreases, i.e., a1(η1) < a0(η0). Since all agents with a1
i ≥ a0(η0)
24have the same endowment level as in period 0, their binding participation constraint implies
that they have the same income level. All other agents have a strictly lower income level than
a0(η0). Since transfers sum to zero with the new threshold ¯ a1(η1), it must be the case that
total output has declined relative to its period 0 value. Since the old enforcement level η0 is
still feasible, this allocation cannot be optimal. A contradiction.
Hence, a1 > a0. A simple recursive argument then shows that there is positive, but
declining enforcement in all subsequent periods. This implies that average income rises over
time, raising the lower income threshold as well. We have then shown that the sequence of
endowment distributions is a monotonically increasing sequence of distribution functions on
[0,1]. Furthermore, we can bound the values of each distribution of the sequence below by 0
and above by γ
1
1−α
max. It then follows that the sequence of endowment distributions converges
to some distribution as t → ∞. Along this sequence, we have successively less inequality and
lower, but strictly positive enforcement.
This result implies that diﬀerences in institutional choices caused by diﬀerences in initial
conditions can persist indeﬁnitely, for reasons not unlike those explored in another context
by Monnet and Quintin (2007). Institutional investments, in turn, allow for inequality to
become reduced over time in a very speciﬁc sense. The endowment distribution is a censored
version of the autarky distribution, with an ever higher censoring point. While there is always
a strictly positive investment in enforcement, the fact that the ex-ante dispersion of marginal
products falls over time causes the optimal level of enforcement to fall over time as well.
6 Concluding Remarks
In much of the recent literature on inequality and growth, it is the combination of endow-
ment inequality and market imperfections that leads to bad economic outcomes and create a
rationale for redistribution. In this paper, we have pointed out that as long as it is possible to
invest in better-functioning markets, the optimal social arrangement calls for a combination
of redistribution and institutional investment.
It is critical to recognize that it is the ex-ante inequality in marginal products that matters
for our results, and not endowment inequality per se. For instance, societies where physical
and human capital endowments are highly correlated do not necessarily have an incentive to
invest in costly institutions that improve market exchange. This suggests that investment
in human capital and in institutional quality are intimately related. Investments in human
25capital raise the returns to investments in institutions. Conversely, better institutions enable
nations to direct physical resources to their most productive uses, which raises returns to
human capital development. Under those circumstances, the question of whether institution
quality or human capital is the key to development success may be immaterial (see, for
example, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) or Galor and Moav (2006)),
since it is the dynamic interaction between the two that matters.
These fundamental ideas should be robust to introducing frictions other than limited
enforcement in our framework and modeling speciﬁc mechanisms whereby better institutions
help mitigate these other frictions. Delays in institutional developments are likely to arise
whenever the beneﬁts of these investments cannot be distributed across agents in a way that
makes ﬁnancing initial costs feasible.
7 Appendix
7.1 Existence and Generic Uniqueness
Proposition 7.1. A solution to the social planner’s problem exists. The solution is generically
unique.
Proof. The planner’s problem is a Mayer problem with integral (isoperimetric) constraints
(see section 4.8 in Cesari (1983)). In order to apply Filippov’s existence theorem, we need to
restrict transfers and capital choices to a compact set. One can impose arbitrary bounds on
both objects that are large enough not to bind at any solution. This ensures existence.
To establish generic uniqueness, note that given the ﬁxed cost associated with implement-
ing the enforcement technology, we need to compare the value of the problem when η = 0 –
i.e., the value of the problem at autarky – and the value of the problem when the planner
chooses to bear the ﬁxed enforcement cost limη&0 g(η).
This second problem corresponds to solving the problem, assuming that g(0) = limη&0 g(η).
We will argue that the solution under that assumption is unique, so that the only case in
which multiple solutions exist is when that solution happens to give exactly the same value
as autarky. Generically, there is then at most one solution.
Under the assumption that g(0) = limη&0 g(η), the planner’s choice set is convex in
(η,k,t). Since the planner’s objective function is strictly concave in k, there is at most one
optimal capital allocation in that case. The resource constraint then implies that η must
26be unique as well. The transfer scheme is also unique because, as we argue below, either
the participation or the enforcement constraint must bind for all agents. If the enforcement
constraint binds, we have ti = η. If the participation constraint of the agent is binding,
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